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Abstract
It is trite that the law on directors’ duties is an important part of corporate governance. It is
therefore unsurprising that a large part of extant research in the area is focused on
understanding what the law requires, and how it applies or should apply in any particular
situation. Such research is however largely reactive. In our research, we set out to look at
duties from the perspective of the directors, with a view to appreciating how Singapore
directors understand the law as it applies to them. The impetus for this is three-fold: ﬁrst,
to assess the depth of awareness amongst directors of the law on directors’ duties; second,
to ascertain if there is any divergence between the law’s conceptualization of what is in the
company’s interests, and the director’s own view as to how he or she would act in fact; and
third, and ﬂowing from the preceding, to assess the need for providing or improving
knowledge enhancement courses targeted speciﬁcally at company directors. To collect the
necessary data, we reached out to registered company directors of both listed companies
and private companies to complete a survey. We released the survey online, and also
conducted face-to-face interviews. Our article presents and analyzes the results of the
survey.
1. background to the study
It has been observed that comparative studies in corporate law are often informed by
the ‘impressive’1 underlying uniformity not only of the corporate form but also of the
laws that govern it. As Armour and others observed, ‘[b]usiness corporations have a
fundamentally similar set of legal characteristics – and face a fundamentally similar set
* Advocate and Solicitor (Singapore). Associate Professor, School of Law, Singapore Management
University.
** Associate Professor, Lee Kong Chian School of Business, Singapore Management University.
1. John Armour and others, ‘What is Corporate Law?’ in Reinier Kraakman and others (eds), The Anatomy
of Corporate Law – A Comparative and Functional Approach (3rd edn, OUP 2017) 1.
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of legal problems – in all jurisdictions’.2 One of the core legal attributes identiﬁed3 is
delegated management under a board structure.4 This makes the company director a
ubiquitous ﬁgure in companies and corporations across jurisdictions, and the need to
regulate the director’s conduct and actions a unifying concern.
In Singapore, the imposition of duties on directors involves a complex mix of statute
and general law. The Companies Act (CA), which is the main piece of legislation
regulating the administration of companies, contains a number of provisions that
oblige the director to take a certain course of conduct in particular speciﬁed
circumstances.5 In addition, the CA contains a general statement of directors’ duties
in the form of Section 157. Speciﬁcally, the provision obliges a director to act honestly
at all times and to use reasonable diligence in the discharge of the duties of his ofﬁce.
The duties of honesty and reasonable diligence are conceptually distinct, and as Yong
Pung How CJ noted in Lim Weng Kee v Public Prosecutor,6 are ‘different aspects of a
director’s bundle of duties even though they may overlap on certain facts’. Singapore
courts have made clear that these duties are based, respectively, on the general law
duties to act bona ﬁde in the interests of the company,7 and to exercise care and
diligence.8 Accordingly, the common law that explains and interprets these duties is of
signiﬁcance and relevance in interpreting the statutory duty.9 In this connection, it
should be pointed out that Singapore’s company law, like many Commonwealth
jurisdictions, is based on English common law. As a result of this common heritage,10
there tend to be more similarities than differences in the laws that govern directors’
duties throughout the Commonwealth. Indeed, Singapore courts frequently refer to
and cite judgments from England, as well as other established common law countries
including Australia and Canada.11 Additionally, Section 157 of the CA does not
purport to replace all the duties imposed at general law. The Section itself expressly
provides12 that it is ‘in addition to and not in derogation of any other written law or
2. ibid.
3. The authors identiﬁed ﬁve basic legal characteristics – legal personality, limited liability, transferable
shares, delegated management, and investor ownership.
4. For an account of the historical origins of the board, see Harald Baum, ‘The Rise of the Independent
Director in theWest: Understanding the Origins of Asia’s Legal Transplants’ in DanW Puchniak, Harald
Baum, and Luke Nottage (eds), Independent Directors in Asia – A Historical, Contextual and
Comparative Approach (CUP 2017) 21, 28–33.
5. See eg Companies Act (Cap 50, 2006Rev Ed), s 156which obliges a director with a conﬂicting interest or
duty to declare this at a board meeting or give written notice of the same to the company.
6. [2002] SGHC 193, [2002] 2 SLR(R) 848 [32].
7. Ho Kang Peng v Scintronix Corp Ltd [2014] SGCA 22, [2014] 3 SLR 329 [35], [42]; Townsing Henry
George v Jenton Overseas Investment Pte Ltd (in liquidation) [2007] SGCA 13, [2007] 2 SLR(R) 597
[59].
8. LimWeng Kee (n 6). In Falmac Limited v Cheng Ji Lai Charlie [2013] SGHC 113 [65], the Court, citing
Tan Cheng Han (ed), Walter Woon on Company Law (rev 3rd edn, Sweet & Maxwell 2009) [8.13],
accepted that the statutory duty of reasonable diligence also encompasses the common law duty of skill.
9. Lim Weng Kee (n 6) [22].
10. Tan (n 8) [1.50].
11. For a recent study on the prevalence of foreign citations by the Singapore courts, see Kwai Hang Ng and
Brynna Jacobson, ‘How Global is the Common Law? A Comparative Study of Asian Common Law
Systems – Hong Kong, Malaysia and Singapore’ (2017) 12 Asian Journal of Comparative Law 209.
12. CA, s 157(4).
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rule of law relating to the duty or liability of directors’. Thus, a director who escapes
liability under Section 157 may nevertheless ﬁnd himself in breach of his duties at
general law. The consequences for a breach of the statutory duties prescribed under
Section 157 are however likely to be more severe, given that criminal13 and
disqualiﬁcation14 sanctions may be imposed on the errant director.
The law on directors’ duties, as a central pillar of corporate governance regimes,
is already widely studied.15 However, a large part of extant research on directors’
duties is focused on understanding what the law requires, and how it applies or
should apply in any particular situation. Such research, whilst undoubtedly
important and edifying, is nevertheless largely reactive, and often undertaken at a
theoretical level. Whilst empirical studies on different aspects of directors’ duties
have been undertaken in other common law jurisdictions,16 there has been little
research conducted in Singapore to assess what, if any, impact these duties have on
the behaviour of directors. We aim, in this study, to contribute towards bridging
that gap by looking at duties from the perspective of the directors themselves, with a
view to appreciating how Singapore directors understand the law as it applies to
them. There are several justiﬁcations for embarking on a study of this nature. First,
the results may provide some basis on which the efﬁcacy of the law on directors’
duties may be properly assessed, which in turn will inform decisions regarding any
future law reform. The imposition of duties on directors is an attempt at moulding
directorial conduct and behaviour, and to steer directors when performing their
management functions in the direction deemed proper by the law. Ultimately, the
aim of the regulatory regime is to improve, as well as maintain, certain standards of
corporate governance. It is obvious that there will be little effect if these duties are
not properly appreciated by the persons at whom they are aimed. Indeed, concerns
have been expressed from time to time as to the extent to which directors understand
their duties. In England, it was this concern that led to the introduction of a
statutory statement of directors’ duties in the United Kingdom’s Companies Act
2006.17
Second, we hope to ascertain if there is any divergence between the law’s
conceptualization of what is in the company’s interests, and the directors’ own view
as to how he or she would act in fact. Any mismatch will have implications for the
13. CA, s 157(3)(b).
14. CA, s 154.
15. See eg Andrew Keay, Directors’ Duties (3rd edn, LexisNexis 2016); Peter Watts, Directors’ Powers and
Duties (2nd edn, LexisNexis 2015); and Rosemary Teele Langford, Directors’ Duties: Principles and
Application (Federation Press 2014).
16. See Abdul Majid, Low Chee Keong and Krishnan Arjunan, ‘Company Directors’ Perceptions of their
Responsibilities and Duties: A Hong Kong Survey’ (1998) 28(1) Hong Kong Law Journal 60; Aiman
NarimanMohd Sulaiman andWan JamaliahWan Jusoh, ‘Duty of Care, Skill and Diligence: A Survey on
Non-executive Directors in Public Listed Companies in Malaysia’ (2005) 1(2) Corporate Governance
Law Review 305; Shelley Marshall and Ian Ramsay, ‘Stakeholders and Directors’ Duties: Law, Theory
and Evidence’ (2012) 35(1) University of New South Wales Law Journal 291.
17. Company Law Review Steering Group,Modern Company Law for a Competitive Economy: Developing
the Framework (London, HMSO, 2000) para 3.37; Law Commission and Scottish Law Commission,
Company Directors: Regulating Conﬂicts of Interests and Formulating a Statement of Duties (Law Com
No 261, Scot Law Com No 173, 1999) paras 4.25–4.26 and Appendix B.
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boundaries of the core ﬁduciary duty that requires the directors to act in good faith in
the interests of the company. This particular aspect of the present study is in fact
prompted by the recent Singapore Court of Appeal decision in Ho Kang Peng v
Scintronix Corp Ltd.18 A director was sued by his company for being in breach of his
directors’ duties in, inter alia, authorizing payments under a ﬁctitious consultancy
agreement. The director asserted that the payments (which were essentially bribes)19
were made for the purpose of procuring business deals for the company. Accordingly,
he argued that he was not in breach of his duties as he had acted in the company’s
interests. The Court of Appeal agreed that the payments were made for the purposes
asserted by the director.20 Indeed, the Court noted that the payments ‘can be said to
have been made in order to beneﬁt the Company ﬁnancially’.21 Nevertheless, the
Court of Appeal afﬁrmed the High Court’s ﬁnding that there was a breach of
directors’ duties. The Court held that ‘acting in the interests of the company’ did not
mean proﬁt maximization by any means. A director who caused a company to make
payments which are in effect gratuities, thereby exposing the company to the risk of
criminal liability, would not be acting honestly even if he claimed to be furthering the
company’s ﬁnancial interests in the short term.22 The Court of Appeal made clear
that, where appropriate, the court will ‘lift the cloak of corporate immunity’23 even
where the impugned director claims to be acting genuinely to promote the company’s
interests.24 In other words, business judgment is not inviolable. Further, whether the
court considers it appropriate to intervene in any particular case is determined by
reference to an objective yardstick.
Apart from the pronouncements with respect to the law on directors’ duties, the case
is interesting for an entirely different reason. The director in question had appealed
against the High Court’s ﬁnding that he had breached his ﬁduciary duties, but only in
respect of the speciﬁc ﬁnding that he had breached his ﬁduciary duties by authorizing
the payments.25 The irresistible inference is that the director saw nothing disloyal
about acting as he had as the payments were undeniably made with a view to
beneﬁtting the company by procuring certain business for it.26 The very fact of the
appeal thus suggests the distinct possibility of a mismatch between the expectations the
law has of directors, and the perceptions of these men of commerce. In the Singapore
context, this inquiry is of especial importance because of the particular manner in
18. Scintronix (n 7).
19. As the court noted in Scintronix (n 7) [32].
20. ibid [34].
21. ibid [37].
22. ibid [40].
23. ibid [39].
24. ibid [38].
25. There was no appeal against the ﬁnding that the director had breached his ﬁduciary duty in failing to
obtain board approval for the remuneration paid to certain contracted advisers: ibid [4].
26. It may well be that it was the legal advisers who took the view that the director had not acted in breach,
and hence advised the appeal on that basis, a point that was insightfully made by Professor Dan W
Puchniak, Faculty of Law, National University of Singapore (15th Asian Law Institute Conference, ‘Law
into the Future: Perspectives from Asia’, Seoul, 10–11 May 2018). An earlier version of this article was
presented at the conference.
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which directors’ duties are regulated. As noted earlier, the duty to act bona ﬁde in the
interests of the company is codiﬁed as a duty to act honestly in Section 157 of the CA,
and a breach of this statutory duty results in a criminal offence. Although the
progenitor of the statutory duty, namely the general law duty to act in good faith in the
interests of the company, is subjectively assessed,27 the Court of Appeal in Scintronix
applied an objective yardstick to determine breach of the duty to act honestly.
Directors operate in diverse environments and their individual decisions may be driven
bymyriad factors. Different directors may therefore arrive at different conclusions even
if the good faith of the director is not in issue. Taking a purely objective view of the
impugned conduct may sometimes be too harsh on the director, especially since
the consequence of a ﬁnding of breach is criminal in nature. If the results indicate the
existence of a gap, this might prompt us to consider how the boundaries of the duty
contained in Section 157 of the CA, and correspondingly the offence, which is
committed as a result of a breach thereof, ought to be drawn.
Third, and ﬂowing from the preceding, if there are indeed speciﬁc duties or rules that
may be highlighted as being less appreciated, an assessment may be taken of any need
for providing or improving knowledge enhancement courses targeted speciﬁcally at
company directors. An appreciation of the knowledge shortfall will be useful in
crafting appropriate outreach measures. The law does not impose minimum
qualiﬁcation requirements for directors, but yet has minimum expectations of
directors; it may well be that some degree of professionalization of directors is
necessary.
ii. method
A. Survey
Data was gathered by means of a survey, which comprised four sections. The ﬁrst
section consisted of a series of statements relating to directors’ duties. The respondents
were asked to indicate whether they agreed or disagreed with the statements. We
included statements that relate to the duty to act bona ﬁde in the interests of the
company. Through these statements, we hoped to discern the following: (1) whether
the respondents saw any particular person or class of persons as being the ultimate
beneﬁciary of their exercise of corporate power; (2) whether the respondents equated
proﬁt-making with the interests of the company for the purposes of directors’ duties;
and (3) whether the respondents were cognizant that a breach of directors’ duties is
potentially a criminal offence under Singapore law.
We also included statements relating to the duty of care, skill, and diligence
speciﬁcally as it applies to ﬁnancial statements. This aspect of the survey was inspired
by the Australian Federal Court decision in Australian Securities and Investments
Commission v Healey.28 Domini Stuart described the case as ‘widely reported as
27. Re Smith and Fawcett, Limited [1942] 1Ch 304 (CA) 306 cited by the Singapore Court of Appeal in, inter
alia,Cheong KimHock v Lin Securities (Pte) (in liquidation) [1992] SGCA 17, [1992] 1 SLR(R) 497 [26];
Goh Chan Peng v Beyonics Technology Ltd [2017] SGCA 40, [2017] 2 SLR 592 [35].
28. [2011] FCA 717, (2011) 278 ALR 618.
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having serious implications for company directors – there was even talk of boardrooms
emptying overnight’.29 The defendant directors (comprising the chief executive ofﬁcer
who was also a director, and six non-executive directors) had failed to notice that AUD
1.5 billion of short-term liabilities had been erroneously classiﬁed as non-current
liabilities in the company’s consolidated ﬁnancial statements, and had approved the
consolidated ﬁnancial statements of the group. The directors’ contention, that they
were entitled to rely on ‘the highly skilled composition of the Centro accounting team
and the auditors (who gave all the necessary assurances and did not raise any concerns)
and the scope of [the auditor’s] retainer (which extended to all areas of compliance
with the accounting standards)’,30 was rejected by the Federal Court which held that
the directors had contravened the statutory duty of care and diligence.31 Middleton J
stated:32
[T]here is a core, irreducible requirement of directors to be involved in the management of
the company and to take all reasonable steps to be in a position to guide and monitor.
There is a responsibility to read, understand and focus upon the contents of those reports
which the law imposes a responsibility upon each director to approve or adopt… All
directors must carefully read and understand ﬁnancial statements before they form the
opinions which are to be expressed in the declaration required by [the Corporations Act].
Such a reading and understanding would require the director to consider whether the
ﬁnancial statements were consistent with his or her own knowledge of the company’s
ﬁnancial position.
Wewere interested to see how the respondents would react to a similar situation as that
in Healey, and also the extent to which they would rely on auditors and the
management team in connection with statutorily-required ﬁnancial statements. There
are good reasons for this inquiry. First, the scenario is one that is not unique to
Australian boardrooms. Directors on Singapore boards, like their counterparts on
Australian boards, are statutorily required to form and declare an opinion, inter alia,
that the ﬁnancial statements fairly reﬂect the ﬁnancial position of the company.33
Second, the duty of reasonable diligence codiﬁed in Section 157 of the CA is derived
from Section 124 of the Australian Uniform Companies Act 1961.34 Whilst the
expressed form of the duty has undergone several iterations in the Australian
legislation,35 the principles that apply to the statutory duty remain substantially the
same. The common heritage that Singapore’s Section 157 of the CA shares with the
29. Domini Stuart, ‘Centro: A Year On’ (Company Director Magazine, 1 August 2012) <www.
companydirectors.com.au/director-resource-centre/publications/company-director-magazine/2012-
back-editions/august/feature-centro-a-year-on> accessed 14 December 2018.
30. Healey (n 28) [220].
31. Australian Corporations Act 2001 (Cth), s 180.
32. Healey (n 28) [16]–[17].
33. CA, s 201(16). See also Australian Corporations Act 2001 (Cth), s 295(4).
34. The Australian UniformCompanies Act 1961was in turn largely based on Companies Act 1948 (UK): see
generally Harold AJ Ford, ‘Uniform Companies Legislation’ (1962) 4 University of Queensland Law
Journal 133.
35. Robert P Austin and Ian M Ramsay, Ford, Austin and Ramsay’s Principles of Corporations Law (17th
edn, LexisNexis Butterworths 2018) [8.305.3].
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present Australian statutory duty of care and diligence means that the case and the
principles upon which it was decided are likely to be inﬂuential in deﬁning the
boundaries of the duty under Section 157 of the CA. Third, and afﬁrming the preceding
point, local courts have held that the standards applicable to the statutory duty of care
and diligence in Australia36 also represent the position in Singapore.37 These reasons
underscore the likelihood that Singapore courts will decide consistently with the
Healey court. In the circumstances, appreciating how Singapore directors would react
in a Healey scenario will expose any gap or mismatch in expectations between the
regulation and the regulated.
The second section of the survey comprised a set of three hypothetical scenarios
adapted from decided cases. Respondents were asked to respond to statements relating
to those scenarios using a Likert-like scale38 ranging from 1 (Strongly disagree) to 5
(Strongly agree). The ﬁrst scenario was adapted from Scintronix. The second scenario
describes the facts ofGolden Village Multiplex Pte Ltd v Phoon Chiong Kit.39 The case
concerned a nominee director who found himself caught between a rock and a hard
place. The plaintiff company was a joint venture between two partners, and the
director was appointed to its board as a representative of one of the partners. A dispute
arose between that partner and the plaintiff company, and the director, as a director of
the partner, ﬁled afﬁdavits on the latter’s behalf. The plaintiff company brought a claim
against the director for breaching his directors’ duties to the plaintiff company. The
Court found for the plaintiff company. Clearly the director was in a difﬁcult position.
At the time of his impugned act, the joint venture partners had already fallen out. In the
circumstances, the interests of the plaintiff company were clearly no longer aligned
with the interests of the partner. In such a scenario, it does seem somewhat unrealistic
to expect the director to remain concerned with his loyalties to the plaintiff company.40
As nominee directors are commonplace, we were keen to ascertain the respondents’
understanding of their legal obligations when placed in similar situations. The third
scenario was drawn fromHealey on the duty of care, skill, and diligence with respect to
understanding ﬁnancial statements.
The third section of the survey comprised a series of statements designed to ascertain
the extent to which respondents are affected by the potential exposure to civil and
criminal liability when acting as directors. In the ﬁnal section of the survey, we included
an assessment of the extent to which directors trust the senior management team in the
company that they are board members of. We measured trust using a four-item Likert-
like scale adapted fromMayer and Gavin.41 Respondents assessed the extent to which
36. It has been held that these standards are the same as the standards applied at common law: Daniels
(formerly practising as Deloitte Haskins & Sells) v Anderson (1995) 16 ACSR 607 (New South Wales
Court of Appeal). See generally Austin and Ramsay (n 35) [8.305.6].
37. Lim Weng Kee v PP (n 6) [28]. This was recently afﬁrmed by the Court of Appeal in Ho Yew Kong v
Sakae Holdings Ltd [2018] SGCA 33, [2018] 2 SLR 333 [137].
38. Adapted from Roger CMayer and Mark B Gavin, ‘Trust in Management and Performance: Who Minds
the Shop While the Employees Watch the Boss?’ (2005) 48(5) Academy of Management Journal 874.
39. [2006] SGHC 38, [2006] 2 SLR(R) 307.
40. See also Kuwait Asia Bank EC v National Mutual Life Nominees Limited [1990] UKPC 23, [1991] AC
187.
41. Mayer and Gavin (n 38).
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they agreed with statements on trust in senior management. An example of the
statement reads: ‘I would be willing to let the senior management team have control
over decisions that are important to me.’
B. Data and Sample
Data was collected between mid-2017 to early 2018 from multiple sources, and with
different methods. The survey was ﬁrst released via an online portal Qualtrics using a
snowballing sampling technique where our contacts introduced other contacts. This is
augmented by data collection using the paper and pencil method in a series of seminars
conducted in 2017 by the Singapore Institute of Directors (SID) and run by the ﬁrst
author of this article. In addition, we acquired a list of companies from the Singapore
Accounting and Corporate Regulatory Authority (ACRA), together with their
registered directors. Teams of research assistants were assigned to different localities
to approach directors of the listed companies. Using different methodologies, we
endeavoured to reach out to a more diverse and representative set of directors.
iii. results and analysis
In total, we received 65 completed responses: 33.8 per cent of the respondents were
between the ages of 51–60 (inclusive), and 41.5 per cent of them hold a Master’s
degree; 64.6 per cent of the respondents hold executive directorships, and 34.4 per cent
of them sit on boards where the business is family-owned and -controlled (see Table 1
for detailed demographics of the respondents). On average, the respondents sit on 2.78
boards, with 9.22 years of executive board experience.
The ﬁndings of the survey are tabulated in Tables 2 to 7. In general, we found few
differences in the responses with respect to the respondents’ demographics except for
the three statements indicated in Table 2 (Statement 5 and 9) and Table 3 (Statement 5).
In discussing our ﬁndings, we refer to both the statements in the ﬁrst section of the
survey and the related scenarios. While the statements assess the respondents’
understanding of the law, the scenarios relate to the application of the law, hence
providing a comprehensive understanding of directors’ duties as they apply to the
respondents. We present our ﬁndings in the following order: (A) Understanding
stakeholders’ interests; (B) Deﬁning ‘interests of the company’; (C) Obligations of
nominee directors; (D) Duties in connection with ﬁnancial statements; and (E)
Corporate governance and trust.
A. Understanding stakeholders’ interests
The duty to act bona ﬁde in the interests of the company is the fundamental obligation
owed by the director to his company. As Lord Greene MR stated in Re Smith and
Fawcett, Limited,42 ‘directors must exercise their discretion bona ﬁde in what they
consider – not what a court may consider – is in the interests of the company’.
42. (n 27) 306.
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The duty obliges the director to exercise his discretion in a manner that he thinks, in
his own mind, best serves or advances the company’s interests. A number of questions in
the survey attempted to discern how the respondents view the company’s interests.
Speciﬁcally, we sought to ascertainwhether the respondents see the shareholders as being
the ultimate beneﬁciary of their exercise of power (Table 2, Statements 1–6). Whilst the
law grants the duly-incorporated company separate legal status from its incorporators, it
nevertheless accords those incorporators and all who subsequently become shareholders
collectively a pre-eminent position. The statutory corporate governance regime provided
for under the CA is premised on a shareholder-centric view43 of the company. This is
because shareholders, as contributors of capital, were traditionally treated as ‘owners’44
of the company for whose ultimate beneﬁt the company is run.45 Consistent with this,
Table 1. Demographic Background
Frequency Per cent
Age (in 2017)
<30 years old 3 4.6
31–40 years old 14 21.5
41–50 years old 17 26.2
51–60 years old 22 33.8
>60 years old 9 13.8
Educational Qualiﬁcations
Primary and Secondary School 1 1.5
Diploma 1 1.5
Bachelor’s degree 12 18.5
Master’s degree 27 41.5
PhD or DBA 18 27.7
Professional Qualiﬁcation (eg ACCA) 4 6.2
Others 2 3.1
Type of Directorship Held
Executive 42 64.6
Non-Executive 7 10.8
Both Executive and Non-Executive 16 24.6
No of Boards*
1 33 51.5
2–5 24 37.5
>5 7 10.9
Type of Business*
Family-controlled 22 34.4
Non-family controlled 42 65.6
*1 missing data point.
43. Also referred to as ‘shareholder primacy’: D Gordon Smith, ‘The Shareholder Primacy Norm’ (1998) 23
(2) Journal of Corporation Law 277, 278.
44. Accordingly, as Sir James Wigram VC noted, the board was ‘always subject to the superior control of the
proprietors assembled in general meetings’: Foss v Harbottle (1843) 2 Hare 461, 67 ER 189 (Court of
Chancery) 203.
45. In Greenhalgh v Arderne Cinemas Ltd [1951] Ch 286 (CA) 291, Evershed MR opined that ‘the phrase,
“the company as a whole”, does not … mean the company as a commercial entity distinct from the
corporators. It means the corporators as a general body’. See also JE Parkinson, Corporate Power and
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shareholders occupy a central role in the control of corporate matters and are granted
exclusive participation and intervention rights under the CA. This includes the power to
alter46 the constitution of the company, and the right to propose and pass resolutions.47
Additionally, the power of the company to ratify the directors’ breaches of duties is
usually considered to be exercisable by the shareholders.48
Table 2. Duty to Act Bona Fide in the Interests of the Company (Percentages)
Statements Agree Disagree
Not
sure
1. When performing his duties, a director is required to consider only the interests
of the shareholders.
14.1 85.9* 0
2. Directors owe their duties to the shareholders of the company. 66.7 31.7* 1.6
3. Directors are not in breach of their duties if they decide to invest the company’s
funds in charitable events or other philanthropic acts even if there is no
immediate proﬁt or gain for the shareholders.
50.0* 29.7 20.3
4. Shareholders may sue directors for damages if the directors’ breach of their
duties resulted in a loss in the value of their shareholdings.
61.9 22.2* 15.9
5. As long as the board has obtained the approval of the shareholders in general
meeting to take a particular course of action, the directors cannot be liable for
breach of their duties.**
40.6 53.1* 6.3
6. As a director, I am concerned with the views of the majority shareholders, and
will act in accordance with their directions.
42.2 51.6* 6.3
7. If a director acts or exercises his powers only with a view to maximizing the
proﬁts of the company, he would have acted in the interests of the company.
31.3 64.1* 4.7
8. If a director believes honestly that a particular transaction is in the company’s
interests, he need not worry about being in breach of his duties.
35.9 59.4* 4.7
9. A director who fails to act in the interests of the company may be found to have
committed a criminal offence.***
39.1* 53.1 7.8
10. A director is required to consider the interests of the company’s creditors only
when the company is facing ﬁnancial difﬁculties.
10.9* 87.5 1.6
11. A nominee director is appointed to the board of a company to represent the
interests of the appointor. A nominee director is therefore permitted to act in
accordance with the instructions of his appointor even if doing so may not be in
the interests of the company.
26.6 65.6* 7.8
12. A director is permitted to take into account the interests of stakeholders other
than shareholders when performing his functions.
90.8* 3.1 6.2
*Denotes the correct answer.
**There is a signiﬁcant difference in the reported responses for family and non-family
business (1.41 versus 1.79), that is, directors from non-family businesses reported the correct
response signiﬁcantly higher in frequency than directors from family businesses.
***There is a signiﬁcant difference in the reported responses between respondents who sit on
one board and respondents who sit on more than ﬁve boards, with the latter signiﬁcantly more
likely to get the correct answer.
Responsibility – Issues in the Theory of Company Law (OUP 1993) 75–76; Adolf A Berle Jr and Gardiner
C Means, The Modern Corporation and Private Property (1st edn, Macmillan 1932) 335.
46. CA, s 26.
47. CA, ss 176 and 183.
48. Rafﬂes Town Club Pte Ltd v Lim Eng Hock Peter [2012] SGCA 62, [2013] 1 SLR 374.
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Interestingly, however, the responses show that almost 86 per cent of the
respondents did not think that a director is required to consider only the interests of
the shareholders (Table 2, Statement 1). Consistent with this, almost 91 per cent of the
respondents agree with the statement ‘[a] director is permitted to take into account the
interests of stakeholders other than shareholders when performing his functions’
(Table 2, Statement 12). The respondents therefore do not equate the company’s
interests solely with the interests of the shareholders.
As a general proposition, this is likely to be correct. At the same time, however, it
would also not be wrong for directors to place shareholders’ interests at the apex of
their concerns. What amounts to ‘the company’s interests’ is likely to vary in different
contexts.49 In many instances, this would simply refer to the interests of the company
as a separate commercial entity.50 However, it has also been recognized in many cases
that as the company is an artiﬁcial entity, its interests are also very readily identiﬁed
with the interests of its shareholders as a whole,51 albeit not only a particular segment
of them.52 It can nevertheless be concluded from the survey results that the respondents
believe that directors are permitted to take account of the interests of other
stakeholders. This may well be consistent with how directors would, at least
anecdotally, act in practice. In other words, they tend not to compartmentalize the
different stakeholders in a company but will instead act on the basis of what works for
the company as an entity.53 It is of note that the results of our survey compare
favourably with the ﬁndings made by Dr ShelleyMarshall and Professor Ian Ramsay in
a survey of company directors in Australia.54 The objective of that study was to
determine whether Australian directors adhered to a ‘shareholder primacy’ view of
their responsibilities,55 and perceived shareholders as constituting the stakeholder
group to whom they owed their primary responsibility. Consistent with our study, the
Australian data showed that 55 per cent of the respondents believe that acting in the
best interests of the company means balancing the interests of all stakeholders
including employees and creditors.56 Perhaps, this broad consistency in responses
across the two jurisdictions should not be surprising as it is likely that there are more
similarities in business imperatives around the world than there are differences.
It is however not apparent whether the respondents think that the law mandates a
consideration of interests other than that of shareholders. Although it is true that in
most cases, shareholders’ interests should align with the company’s interests, so that
there is no real need to distinguish between them, it is not uncommon for the interests
of the company to diverge from that of the shareholders. Chan SengOnn J provided the
49. As Nourse LJ observed in Brady v Brady [1988] BCLC 20 (CA) 40.
50. Rafﬂes Town Club Pte Ltd v Lim Eng Hock Peter [2010] SGHC 163 [162] (on appeal: Rafﬂes Town
Club Pte Ltd v Lim Eng Hock Peter (n 48)).
51. Brady v Brady (n 49) 40; Greenhalgh v Arderne Cinemas Ltd (n 45) 291.
52. Gaiman v National Association for Mental Health [1971] Ch 317 (Ch) 330.
53. We thank Associate Professor Umakanth Varottil, Faculty of Law, National University of Singapore for
this observation.
54. Marshall and Ramsay (n 16), 291.
55. ibid.
56. ibid 304.
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following example in Rafﬂes Town Club Pte Ltd v Lim Eng Hock Peter:57 ‘when a
decision is made to plough proﬁts back into the company rather than pay them out as
dividends or bonuses, it reﬂects a decision to prefer the interests of the company as a
commercial entity over the interests of the shareholders and employees as individuals.’
The survey results show that 66.7 per cent of the respondents would consider that
they owe their duties as directors to the shareholders (Table 2, Statement 2), while
some 61.9 per cent of the respondents believe that the shareholders may sue directors
for any loss which the shareholders might have suffered as a result of the directors’
breach of duties (Table 2, Statement 4). Further, more than 40 per cent of the
respondents would be concerned with the views of the majority shareholders and go so
far as to act in accordance with their instructions (Table 2, Statement 6). A similar
proportion (40.6 per cent) also believe that the board will be protected against
prosecution for breach of duties had the shareholders approved of its acts (Table 2,
Statement 5). Whilst not strictly majority, these latter ﬁgures nevertheless represent an
appreciable proportion of the respondents. These results may suggest some internal
inconsistency in the responses given that one should, logically, be mostly concerned
with the interests of the person to whom one believes a duty is owed. Nevertheless, that
inconsistency can be explained if the respondents subscribe to the view that the law
mandates due consideration of stakeholder interests.
With one accepted exception, the law does not require consideration of the interests
of speciﬁc stakeholders. A director who exercises his discretion to prefer the interests of
the company as a separate entity over the interests of the shareholders is not likely to be
considered in breach of his duty.58 Indeed, there is English authority that the
company’s separate interests ought to prevail.59 As a general proposition, this must be
right. However, adhering too rigidly to it might suggest that the director would be in
breach of his duties if, conversely, he had preferred the interests of the shareholders.
The true position is probably that the subjective nature of the duty behoves the director
to undertake a balancing exercise, and to ultimately arrive at a considered decision on
what would be in the company’s interests. Chan J recognized as much in the Rafﬂes
Town Club case when he noted that ‘the Court should not view every transaction
which does not positively result in proﬁtable returns to the company as a commercial
entity with suspicion’.60
In a similar manner, the subjective nature of the duty would mean that the director is
not precluded from taking account of the interests of a wider range of ‘stakeholders’
other than shareholders, as long as they do so with the company’s interests ﬁrmly in
view. That the director is entitled to take account of the interests of the company’s
57. (n 50) [162].
58. Mutual Life Assurance Co of New York v Rank Organisation Ltd [1985] BCLC 11 (Ch) 21; Re BSB
Holdings Ltd (No 2) [1996] 1 BCLC 155 (Ch) 249.
59. ibid.
60. (n 50) [163].
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employees is statutorily recognized,61 and there have been decisions condoning the
consideration of the interests of the corporate group of which the company is a part.62
As a general principle, therefore, the law does not mandate that the director must
have regard to all these other potentially relevant interests. The position is facultative,
and commercial decisions arrived at in good faith are not likely to be readily impugned.
This is a manifestation of the so-called business judgment rule, which was expressed as
follows by Tay Yong Kwang J in ECRC Land Pte Ltd (in liquidation) v Ho Wing On
Christopher:63
The court should be slow to interfere with commercial decisions taken by directors ... It
should not, with the advantage of hindsight, substitute its own decisions in place of those
made by directors in the honest and reasonable belief that they were for the best interests of
the company, even if those decisions turned out subsequently to be money-losing ones.
In Vita Health Laboratories Pte Ltd v Pang Seng Meng,64 VK Rajah JC (as he then
was) explained the policy considerations which underpin the rule:
It is the role of the marketplace and not the function of the court to punish and censure
directors who have in good faith, made incorrect commercial decisions. Directors should
not be coerced into exercising defensive commercial judgment, motivated largely by
anxiety over legal accountability and consequences. Bona ﬁde entrepreneurs and honest
commercial men should not fear that business failure entails legal liability. A company
provides a vehicle for limited liability and facilitates the assumption and distribution of
commercial risk. Undue legal interference will dampen, if not stiﬂe, the appetite for
commercial risk and entrepreneurship.
In this connection, therefore, we can probably conclude from the results of our survey
that the respondents’ understanding of what the law requires of them in connection
with the consideration of relevant stakeholder interests is broadly accurate.
There is however one aspect that stands out, and that is the respondents’ view of
creditor interests. A signiﬁcant majority of 87.5 per cent would disagree that a director
is required to consider the interests of the company’s creditors only when the company
is facing ﬁnancial difﬁculties (Table 2, Statement 10). Put differently, this means that
most of the respondents would take account of creditors’ interests even where the
company is not in ﬁnancial difﬁculties. This is clearly not what the law requires. Whilst
creditors’ interests may be affected by corporate acts, they are usually considered
‘outsiders’ whose interests are governed contractually. The law therefore does not
mandate consideration of creditors’ interests generally. The position however changes
when the company is insolvent or very nearly so. Where the company is in a difﬁcult
ﬁnancial situation, directors are obliged to take account of the interests of the
61. CA, s 159.
62. See eg Intraco Ltd v Multi-Pak Singapore Pte Ltd [1994] SGCA 142, [1994] 3 SLR(R) 1064.
63. [2003] SGHC 298, [2004] 1 SLR(R) 105 [49].
64. [2004] SGHC 158, [2004] 4 SLR(R) 162 [17].
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company’s creditors. In Liquidators of Progen Engineering Pte Ltd v Progen Holdings
Ltd,65 the Court of Appeal stated as follows:66
It is trite that directors have a duty to act in the best interest of the company as a whole.
When a company is solvent, the company’s directors owe no duty to creditors. …
However, it is now also settled law that when a company is insolvent, or even in a parlous
ﬁnancial position, directors have a ﬁduciary duty to take into account the interests of the
company’s creditors when making decisions for the company. This ﬁduciary duty requires
directors to ensure that the company’s assets are not dissipated or exploited for their own
beneﬁt to the prejudice of creditors’ interests.67
The rationale for imposing this obligation on the directors is that, in a company’s
insolvency, the shareholders cease, in a practical sense, to have any real interest in the
company’s assets. Insolvency distribution rules require these assets to be utilized ﬁrst to
pay off the company’s creditors.68 Therefore, it would be the creditors who are, in
reality, primarily interested in those assets.69 From the survey results, it would appear
that the respondents would generally prefer to err on the side of caution. We are unable
to tell whether such an attitude translates into less risk-taking by the directors, or
whether this is indicative of a certain cultural aversion to business derring-do. The
latter possibility is in part supported by the responses to the statements ‘I am concerned
about my exposure to civil and criminal liability’ (mean=4.20, Table 3, Statement 2),
and ‘I am concerned about my personal lack of qualiﬁcations’ (mean= 2.92, Table 3,
Statement 5). It appears that fewer are concerned about their lack of qualiﬁcations than
their exposure to personal liability. In theory at least, if one is not concerned about
qualiﬁcations, he should be similarly less concerned about personal liability. In other
words, a person who has conﬁdence in his qualiﬁcations should not be too worried,
one would have thought, about falling short of his obligations. It may thus be surmised
that, perhaps, some of this caution is driving the responses.
B. Deﬁning ‘Interests of the Company’
In Scintronix, the Court of Appeal stated that ‘[t]he “interests of the company” is not
just proﬁt maximization. Neither is it proﬁt maximization by any means’.70We sought
to ﬁnd out if this accorded with the views of the directors generally by seeking the
respondents’ reactions to the statement ‘If a director acts or exercises his powers only
with a view to maximizing the proﬁts of the company, he would have acted in the
interests of the company’. Somewhat surprisingly, 64.1 per cent of the respondents
65. [2010] SGCA 31, [2010] 4 SLR 1089.
66. ibid [48].
67. See furtherChip Thye Enterprises Pte Ltd (in liquidation) v Phay GiMo [2003] SGHC 307, [2004] 1 SLR
(R) 434; Kinsela v Russell Kinsela Pty Ltd (1986) 4 NSWLR 722 (New South Wales Court of Appeal)
730; Winkworth v Edward Baron Development Co Ltd [1987] 1 All ER 114 (HL) 118; West Mercia
Safetywear Ltd v Dodd [1988] BCLC 250 (CA) 252–53; Brady v Brady (n 49) 40.
68. CA, s 328.
69. Hellard v Carvalho; In the Matter of HLC Environmental Projects Ltd (in liquidation) [2013] EWHC
2876 (Ch) [92].
70. Scintronix (n 7) [40].
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would disagreewith the statement (Table 2, Statement 7). In other words, 64.1 per cent
of the respondents would agree with the Court of Appeal.
A more nuanced picture emerges if we look at the responses to the scenario
provided. The scenario is based on the factual situation that arose in Scintronix. The
protagonist John is a newly-appointed chief executive ofﬁcer who had continued
the company’s practice of making undocumented payments to secure business for the
company. 10.9 per cent of the respondents would ‘strongly agree’ with the statement
that ‘[a]s the CEO, John would not have considered that the payments were for the
beneﬁt of the company’, whilst 4.7 per cent would ‘somewhat agree’, 28.1 per cent
would ‘strongly disagree’, and 34.4 per cent would ‘somewhat disagree’ (Table 4,
Statement 1). In relation to the statement ‘John did not act in the interests of the
company because making such payments is against the law’, 46.2 per cent would
‘strongly agree’ whilst 13.8 per cent would ‘somewhat agree’ (Table 4, Statement 3).
These ﬁgures suggest that the respondents appreciated the difference between
commercial beneﬁt to the company and the legal requirement of ‘interests of the
company’ – the concepts are not necessarily coterminous. However, 40 per cent of the
respondents were either unsure, or would ‘strongly disagree’ or ‘somewhat disagree’
that John had not acted in the interests of the company.
Table 3. Concerns with Sitting on Boards (Percentages)
Means
(standard
deviation)
Strongly
disagree
Somewhat
disagree
Neither
agree or
disagree
Somewhat
agree
Strongly
agree
1. As a result of rising community
expectations of company directors,
I am less willing to accept a position
as a non-executive director on the
board of a listed company.
2.94 (1.19) 15.6 20.3 25.0 32.8 6.3
2. I am concerned about my exposure
to civil and criminal liability.
4.20 (0.93) 0 9.4 6.3 39.1 45.3
3. I am concerned about being
disqualiﬁed from acting as a
director if I were to make a mistake.
3.66 (1.17) 4.7 15.6 15.6 37.5 26.6
4. I am concerned about having to
spend more time on compliance and
accountability matters.
3.97 (0.93) 1.6 7.8 10.9 51.6 28.1
5. I am concerned about my personal
lack of qualiﬁcations.
2.92 (1.13) 12.5 25.0 25.0 32.8 4.7
6. As a director, I am more concerned
with being charged for a crime than
with being disqualiﬁed from acting
as a director.
3.95 (1.09) 1.6 14.1 9.4 37.5 37.5
7. I believe that the duties imposed on
directors by the law are effectively
enforced.
3.65 (0.88) 0 11.1 28.6 44.4 15.9
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We also sought to ascertain how the respondents would relate these concepts of
commercial beneﬁt and ‘interests of the company’ to breach of their directors’ duties.
We thus included the statement ‘[i]f a director believes honestly that a particular
transaction is in the company’s interests, he need not worry about being in breach of his
duties’ (Table 2, Statement 8). To this statement, 59.4 per cent of the respondents
would disagree. This suggests that a good proportion of the respondents are aware that
breach of their duties as directors is not tested by reference only to what they might
honestly believe to be in the company’s interests. When the matter is placed within the
context of the scenario with the statement ‘John did not breach any duty as he was
furthering the company’s ﬁnancial interests’ (Table 4, Statement 5), more respondents
(more than 65 per cent) would consider John’s acts to be a breach of duty, although out
of this, about half or 32.3 per cent would only somewhat disagree with the statement,
suggesting some level of uncertainty. The story that emerges is that the respondents are
clearly very concerned about being in breach of their duties. However, it is not possible
to surmise if this translates in practice to a more cautious approach in decision-making.
C. Obligations of Nominee Directors
We sought to ascertain how respondents would view their obligations in the context of
a nominee situation. A nominee director is appointed to the board of a company to
Table 4. Case Study 1 (Percentages)
John is recently appointed the chief executive ofﬁcer (CEO) of a public-listed company
which has signiﬁcant business interests in China. For a number of years prior to John’s
appointment, the company has been making undocumented payments to a particular
Chinese intermediary under a ‘consultation’ agreement. The real purpose of these
payments is to help secure certain Chinese business for the company. As the new CEO,
John has authorized a number of payments in continuation of the practice.
Strongly
disagree
Somewhat
disagree
Neither
agree or
disagree
Somewhat
agree
Strongly
agree
1. As the CEO, John would not have considered
that the payments were for the beneﬁt of the
company.**
28.1 34.4 21.9 4.7 10.9
2. John should have inquired further before
continuing with the practice.
4.6 0 4.6 13.8 76.9*
3. John did not act in the interests of the
company because making such payments is
against the law.
7.7 10.8 21.5 13.8 46.2*
4. John did not breach any duty as he did not act
to further his own self-interest.
41.5* 27.7 12.3 12.3 6.2
5. John did not breach any duty as he was
furthering the company’s ﬁnancial interests.
35.4* 32.3 12.3 18.5 1.5
6. John exercised reasonable diligence in
following an established practice.
55.4* 20.0 15.4 7.7 1.5
*Denotes the correct answer.
** Is an opinion statement.
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represent the interests of the appointing party, who may be a shareholder (as is often
the case in joint venture companies) or a creditor. Such directors are commonplace. In
Dairy Containers Ltd v NZI Bank Ltd,71 Thomas J, of the New Zealand High Court,
explained the position of the nominee director as follows:
The plain fact of the matter is that employee-directors do not undertake their
responsibilities to the company of which they are a director without regard to the
interests of their employer. All too often the commercial reality underlying the loyalty of
employee-directors to their employers is neglected or understated. Typically, they have
been appointed with a clear mandate; a mandate to protect and promote their employer’s
interests. They owe their engagement to their employers.
Nominee directors are largely constrained by the ‘no-conﬂict’ rule. The rule proscribes
a director from placing himself in a position where his duty to advance the company’s
interests conﬂicts, or may conﬂict, with his personal interests or some other external
loyalty. As the High Court observed in Rafﬂes Hotel Ltd v L Rayner:72
[A] company is entitled to the undivided loyalty of its directors. A director who is a nominee
of someone else should be left free to exercise his best judgment in the interests of the
company he serves and not in accordance with the directions of his patron. If the company is
not prepared to relax the rule then an action for an injunction would normally lie to restrain
a nominee director from acting in any manner adverse to the interests of the company.
By his very appointment, therefore, the nominee director is placed in a position with the
greatest potential for conﬂict. Nevertheless, there is often little issue in connection with
the nominee director’s appointment per se, as the fact of his extraneous loyalties is
likely to be well known to the company which appointed him. In many cases, the
interests of the appointor are aligned with those of the company. In such cases,
the nominee director is able to ‘serve twomasters to the great advantage of both’.73The
position of the nominee director will however become intractable when the interests of
the company and those of his appointor diverge. As Lord Denning observed in Scottish
Co-Operative Wholesale Society Ltd v Meyer:74
So long as the interests of all concerned were in harmony, there was no difﬁculty. The
nominee directors could do their duty by both companies without embarrassment. But, so
soon as the interests of the two companies were in conﬂict, the nominee directors were
placed in an impossible position… It is plain that, in the circumstances, these [nominee
directors] could not do their duty by both companies...75
71. [1995] 2 NZLR 30 (Auckland High Court) 94–95.
72. [1965] 1MLJ 60 (SGHC).
73. Boulting v Association of Cinematograph, Television and Allied Technicians [1963] 2QB 606 (CA) 637
(Upjohn LJ).
74. [1959] AC 324 (HL).
75. ibid 366. It should however be noted that the decision in Scottish Co-Operative was not, in fact,
concerned with the imposition of liability on the directors. Instead, the ﬁnding that the directors had
preferred the interests of their appointor supported a conclusion that the affairs of the company had been
conducted in a manner oppressive to some of the members of the company, which entitled the minority
shareholders to a remedy under Companies Act 1948 (UK), s 210.
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To ascertain if the respondents are aware of the no-conﬂict rule, we included a
statement that concerns the loyalty of a nominee director. A majority (65.6 per cent) of
the respondents would disagree that a nominee director76 is permitted to act in
accordance with the instructions of his appointor even if so doing may not be in the
interests of the company (Table 2, Statement 11).
The response rate is mirrored in the context of the scenario provided (Table 5),
which involved a joint venture company and directors appointed as representatives of
each of the joint venture partners. This scenario is broadly based on the factual
scenario of the Golden Village case77 with a dispute arising between the company (ie
JVC Pte Ltd) and the appointing joint venture partner. The protagonist nominee
director (Joe) instructed solicitors on behalf of his appointors in respect of the dispute.
64.1 per cent of the respondents would at least ‘somewhat agree’ that ‘Joe is not acting
in the interests of JVC Pte Ltd’ (Table 5, Statement 1). These results suggest that the
respondents are mostly aware that primacy should be accorded to the interests of the
company, which is in keeping with what the law requires.
Table 5. Case Study 2 (Percentages)
JVC Pte Ltd was established as the business vehicle to carry out a joint venture between
Redco Pte Ltd and Blueco Pte Ltd. Joe is one of three directors who were appointed to
the board of JVC Pte Ltd by Redco Pte Ltd. The other two directors were appointed by
Blueco Pte Ltd. JVC Pte Ltd has a contract with Pinkco Pte Ltd, a company that is
related to Redco Pte Ltd, and of which Joe is also director. During the course of the
joint venture, Joe would, in his capacity as a director of Pinkco Pte Ltd, regularly
correspondwith the lawyers for JVC Pte Ltd in connection withmatters arising out of the
contract. No one raised any objection to this. A dispute arose between JVC Pte Ltd and
Pinkco Pte Ltd relating to the performance of the contract, and the Blueco directors on
JVC’s board are seeking legal advice as to the dispute. Joe, in his capacity as director of
Pinkco Pte Ltd, instructed lawyers on behalf of Pinkco Pte Ltd with respect to the dispute.
Strongly
disagree
Somewhat
disagree
Neither
agree or
disagree
Somewhat
agree
Strongly
agree
1. Joe is not acting in the interests of JVC Pte Ltd. 6.3 6.3 23.4 37.5 26.6*
2. Joe has potentially committed an offence. 11.1 24.1 22.2 24.1 18.5*
3. As a director of JVC Pte Ltd, Joe is not entitled
to sacriﬁce the interest of JVC Pte Ltd.
1.6 8.1 6.5 32.3 51.6*
4. A director in Joe’s position could not have
believed he had acted for the beneﬁt of the
company.**
3.2 19.0 31.7 25.4 20.6
5. In instructing the lawyers acting for Pinkco Pte
Ltd, Joe had openly sided with Pinkco Pte Ltd
in its dispute with JVC Pte Ltd. Joe is therefore
in a position of conﬂict.
3.1 3.1 12.5 26.6 54.7*
76. Deﬁned in the survey as someone ‘appointed to the board of a company to represent the interests of the
appointor’.
77. (n 39).
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Interestingly, slightly more than 40 per cent would at least somewhat disagree with the
statement that ‘It is permissible for directors of JVC Pte Ltd to act in the interests of
their appointors’ (Table 5, Statement 7). In other words, these respondents would not
consider it permissible to do so. Roughly the same number would however at least
‘somewhat agree’ with the statement. Additionally, whilst 46 per cent would at least
‘somewhat agree’ that ‘[a] director in Joe’s position could not have believed that he had
acted for the beneﬁt of [JVC Pte Ltd]’, 31.7 per cent (representing the plurality of
respondents) would neither agree nor disagree with the statement (Table 5, Statement
4). This suggests that there might be some ambivalence about the situation. Whilst
there is general appreciation of what amounts to a ‘conﬂict’ situation, the respondents
may feel that there are situations when it should be permissible for a director to act in
the interests of his appointor and are sympathetic to the plight of Joe.
D. Duties in Connection with Financial Statements
A number of statements in the survey deal with the directors’ legal responsibilities vis-à-
vis ﬁnancial statements. Section 201 of the CA imposes on the directors the responsibility
for laying before the company, at its annual general meeting, ﬁnancial statements that:
(1) comply with Accounting Standards issued by the Accounting Standards Council; and
(2) give a true and fair view of the ﬁnancial position and performance of the company.
The ﬁnancial statements must be accompanied by a directors’ statement78 as to,
inter alia, whether in the opinion of the directors the ﬁnancial statements have been
drawn up so as to give a true and fair view of the ﬁnancial position and performance of
the company. This obligation may be considered as not only one that arises statutorily,
but also a responsibility to which the duty of care, skill, and diligence applies.
Directors are required to act with due care, skill, and diligence in the performance of
their functions. This duty imposed low standards at common law, measured by reference
to the director’s own subjective skills set (ie his state of knowledge and experience).
Hence, as Romer J stated in Re City Equitable Fire Insurance Company, Limited:79
Table 5 (Continued )
Strongly
disagree
Somewhat
disagree
Neither
agree or
disagree
Somewhat
agree
Strongly
agree
6. Joe has acted appropriately because he has
acted on behalf of Pinkco Pte Ltd in the past,
and no one raised any objections.
35.9* 28.1 15.6 18.8 1.6
7. It is permissible for the directors of JVC Pte
Ltd to act in the interests of their appointors.
17.2* 26.6 15.6 28.1 12.5
*Denotes the correct answer.
** Is an opinion statement.
78. CA, s 201(16).
79. [1925] Ch 407 (CA) 428.
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The care that [the director] is bound to take… has been described… as ‘reasonable care’ to be
measured by the care an ordinary man might be expected to take in the circumstances on his
own behalf.…Adirector need not exhibit in the performance of his duties a greater degree of
skill than may reasonably be expected from a person of his knowledge and experience.
More recent cases, however, have tended to hold directors to a more demanding
objective standard. This shift in judicial expectations may be a consequence of stricter
statutorily-imposed standards for directors of insolvent companies.80 In Re D’Jan of
London Ltd,81 Hoffmann J had accepted that the duty of care owed by a director at
common law is measured by reference to the conduct of:
[A] reasonably diligent person having both – (a) the general knowledge, skill and
experience that may reasonably be expected of a person carrying out the same functions as
are carried out by the director in relation to the company, and (b) the general knowledge,
skill and experience that that director has.82
This is the standard expected of a director under the wrongful trading provisions of the
United Kingdom’s Insolvency Act 1986. This clearly objective test holds the director not
only to an objective standard of diligence, but also to a ‘core irreducible’83 standard of
skill84 that is expected of a reasonable director in his position, regardless of his personal
abilities, lack thereof, or inexperience. The rationale for raising theminimum standard is the
fact that the director is not an ‘ornament’ or a ‘dummy director’,85 but rather an essential
component of corporate governance. InDaniels v Anderson,86 the Supreme Court of New
South Wales explained what the modern expectations of the company director are:
A person who accepts the ofﬁce of director of a particular company undertakes the
responsibility of ensuring that he or she understands the nature of the duty a director is
called upon to perform. That duty will vary according to the size and business of the
particular company and the experience or skills that the director held himself or herself out
to have in support of appointment to the ofﬁce. None of this is novel. It turns upon the
natural expectations and reliance placed by shareholders on the experience and skill of a
particular director ... The duty includes that of acting collectively to manage the
company.87
80. See CA, s 339(3).
81. [1994] 1 BCLC 561 (Ch) 563.
82. Insolvency Act 1986 (UK), s 214.
83. Australian Securities and Investments Commission (ASIC) v Rich (2009) 75 ACSR 1 (New South Wales
Supreme Court) [7205].
84. InHealey (n 28) [124], it was held that the objective duty of skill or competence required the directors to
have the ability to read and understand ﬁnancial statements, and that this included the understanding that
ﬁnancial statements classify assets and liabilities as current and non-current and what those concepts
mean. However, in ASIC (n 83), Austin J thought that for non-executive directors, the objective duty of
skill may not extend much beyond reading and understanding ﬁnancial material.
85. Francis v United Jersey Bank 432 A 2d 814 (NJ 1981) 812.
86. Daniels (n 36) 668.
87. This view of the obligations imposed on directors was approved and adopted by the Singapore High
Court in Lim Weng Kee (n 6).
56 a s i an journal of comparat i v e law
https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/asjcl.2019.2
Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. IP address: 116.15.182.27, on 29 Jul 2019 at 11:31:26, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use, available at
This ‘modern approach’ was held to represent the position in Singapore.88 These
higher standards notwithstanding, the law permits directors to delegate the
performance of certain tasks to subordinates or experts where appropriate and
permitted by the company’s constitution. As VK Rajah JC (as he then was) noted in
Vita Health Laboratories, it is impractical to expect directors to be ‘omniscient or to
personally discharge all corporate powers and functions’.89 This is especially so in
companies with large and complex businesses. Delegation does not mean that the
director can abdicate all responsibility for the delegated function, although the court
will take a pragmatic view of the matter. Rajah JC explained the judicial approach as
follows:
Legal pragmatism imbued with latitude towards business efﬁcacy is crucial in assessing a
director’s delegation of duties. Admittedly, [the director] must reasonably believe that his
subordinates will competently discharge their duties in the company’s interests. Other than
that it is fair to say that there is no acid test that will provide a deﬁnitive answer. It can
however be safely assumed that the court will be reluctant to take to task a director who
has bona ﬁde delegated his functions and/or powers to competent subordinates.90
There is also statutory recognition of delegation. Section 157C of the CA permits a
director of a company to rely on reports and other information prepared by
employees or another director, and on professional or expert advice given by a
professional adviser. The director relying on such reports or advice can only escape
liability if these reports turn out to be wrong if he had acted in good faith, had made
proper inquiry where the need for inquiry is indicated by the circumstances, and had
no knowledge that such reliance is unwarranted. In connection with the statutory
ﬁnancial reporting requirements, the Federal Court of Australia held inHealey91 that
directors have ‘a responsibility to read, understand and focus upon the contents of
those reports which the law imposes a responsibility upon each director to approve or
adopt’.92 Directors must therefore ‘carefully read and understand ﬁnancial
statements before they form the opinions which are to be expressed in the
declaration required’ in the Corporations Act.93 Accordingly, the Court noted, in
order to fulﬁl this responsibility, directors will need to have sufﬁcient ﬁnancial
literacy ‘to read and understand the ﬁnancial statements, including the understanding
that ﬁnancial statements classify assets and liabilities as current and non-current, and
what those concepts mean’.94
As to how far directors may delegate this particular function, the Court stated:95
88. Lim Weng Kee (n 6) [28].
89. Vita Health Laboratories (n 64) [20].
90. ibid.
91. Healey (n 28).
92. ibid [16].
93. ibid [17], referring speciﬁcally to the Australian Corporations Act 2001 (Cth), s 295(4).
94. ibid [124].
95. ibid [175].
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Directors cannot substitute reliance upon the advice of management for their own
attention and examination of an important matter that falls speciﬁcally within the board’s
responsibilities as with the reporting obligations. The Act places upon the board and each
director the speciﬁc task of approving the ﬁnancial statements. Consequently, each
member of the board was charged with the responsibility of attending to and focusing on
these accounts and, under these circumstances, could not delegate or ‘abdicate’ that
responsibility to others.
We have already noted that the decision in Healey is likely to be of signiﬁcant
inﬂuence in Singapore’s judicial development of the statutory duty of care and
diligence. Accordingly, we sought to ascertain the respondents’ understanding of
their obligations vis-à-vis ﬁnancial statements. A signiﬁcant majority of the
respondents are aware as to the following obligations: (1) that directors are
responsible for ensuring that the ﬁnancial statements are drawn to give a true and
fair view of the ﬁnancial position and performance of the company (96.9 per cent –
Table 6, Statement 5); and (2) that directors are responsible for ensuring that
the ﬁnancial statement complies with the requirements of the Accounting
Standards formulated by the Accounting Standards Council of Singapore (73.4 per
cent – Table 6, Statement 6).
These ﬁgures suggest a high level of awareness of these particular obligations.
What the respondents appear less sure of is the director’s potential exposure to
criminal liability in the event of any infraction of these obligations. The two
statements in the survey relevant to criminal liability in this particular context are the
following:
A director is potentially guilty of an offence if he does not ensure that all known bad debts
are written off and adequate provision is made for doubtful debts.
…
A director may be found guilty of an offence if the ﬁnancial statements do not comply with
the requirements of the Accounting Standards formulated by the Accounting Standards
Council of Singapore.
Statement 4 (Table 6) received a 41.3 per cent correct score, whilst Statement 6
(Table 6) fared better with a reasonably strong 73.4 per cent. A plausible reason for the
difference is that the requirement as to bad debts was only introduced into the
legislation in 2014 pursuant to the Companies (Amendment) Act 2014.
Table 6. Statutory Duties (Percentages)
Statements Agree Disagree
Not
sure
1. Directors are responsible for ensuring that the secretary of the company is a
person who has the requisite knowledge and experience.
95.4* 3.1 1.5
2. Directors are required to ensure that only qualiﬁed lawyers or public
accountants are appointed as the company’s secretaries.
58.5 38.5* 33.3
58 a s i an journal of comparat i v e law
https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/asjcl.2019.2
Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. IP address: 116.15.182.27, on 29 Jul 2019 at 11:31:26, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use, available at
We also included a scenario based on the facts of the Healey decision (Table 7).
The protagonist director is a non-executive director who approved the ﬁnancial
statements despite there being an error in the same which had not been picked up by
either the management of the company or the company’s auditor. Respondents are
generally aware that the responsibility for the accuracy and veracity of the
company’s ﬁnancial statements lies with the directors. A strong majority (87.7 per
cent – Table 7, Statement 2) would at least somewhat agree that all directors,
whether executive or non-executive, will have to take responsibility for the
accuracy and veracity of the ﬁnancial statements. A majority of the respondents
would also at least somewhat agree that, regardless of background and
qualiﬁcations, the directors are required, not only to have some knowledge of
accounting practice and standards, but also to be able to read and understand
ﬁnancial statements (Table 7, Statements 1, 5, and 7). Whilst 67.7 per cent of the
respondents would at least somewhat agree that the director ‘is not entitled to rely
only on the judgment and advice of the Chief Financial Ofﬁcer or of the
management team’ (Table 7, Statement 3), 58.5 per cent would at least somewhat
agree that the director should be ‘entitled to rely on the management team and the
Chief Executive Ofﬁcer to draw the Board’s attention to any discrepancies in the
ﬁnancial statements’ (Table 7, Statement 6).
Table 6 (Continued )
Statements Agree Disagree
Not
sure
3. It is the responsibility of the company’s auditor, and not the directors, to ensure
that the company’s ﬁnancial statements comply with the requirements of the
Accounting Standards formulated by the Accounting Standards Council of
Singapore.
16.9 80.0* 3.1
4. A director is potentially guilty of an offence if he does not ensure that all known
bad debts are written off and adequate provision is made for doubtful debts.
41.3* 31.7 27.0
5. Directors are responsible for ensuring that the ﬁnancial statements are drawn to
give a true and fair view of the ﬁnancial position and performance of the
company.****
96.9* 3.1 0
6. A director may be found guilty of an offence if the ﬁnancial statements do not
comply with the requirements of the Accounting Standards formulated by the
Accounting Standards Council of Singapore.
73.4* 12.5 14.1
7. If a director is not able to read and understand ﬁnancial statements, he would not
be able to form an opinion on the solvency and liquidity of the company.**
63.1 24.6 12.3
*Denotes the correct answer.
** Is an opinion statement.
****There is a signiﬁcant difference in the reported responses between respondents who sit on
one board and respondents who sit on more than ﬁve boards, with the latter signiﬁcantly more
likely to get the correct answer.
directors’ duties in singapore: law and perceptions 59
https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/asjcl.2019.2
Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. IP address: 116.15.182.27, on 29 Jul 2019 at 11:31:26, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use, available at
It is also interesting to see the more nuanced picture provided if we break down the
responses to the Healey scenario by reference to the indicated level of agreement or
disagreement to the relevant statement, as well as by reference to the speciﬁc response to
a statement that is selected the most. Generally speaking, respondents who are certain as
to the ‘correct’ response should, in theory, indicate either strong agreement or
disagreement with any particular statement. From this, the following may be surmised.
Table 7. Case Study 3 (Percentages)
Jane is a non-executive director on the board of Bigco Ltd, a listed company with a number
of subsidiaries. At a board meeting to approve the annual reports of Bigco and its
subsidiaries, Jane voted in favour of a resolution to approve the consolidated ﬁnancial
statements for that ﬁnancial year. The resolution was unanimously passed. The ﬁnancial
statements were prepared by the company’s ﬁnancial management team and subject to the
oversight of Bigco’s chief ﬁnancial ofﬁcer (CFO), and Jane had no reason to doubt either the
competenceorqualiﬁcationsof the teamor theCFO.Theﬁnancial statementswerehowever
erroneous as almost SGD 50 million of short-term liabilities had been classiﬁed as non-
current liabilities. The error was not picked up by the auditor who gave the statements full
audit clearance. Jane, who is not a qualiﬁed accountant, did not fully review the annexures
of the operational reports which were provided to her as these ran into hundreds of pages.
Strongly
disagree
Somewhat
disagree
Neither
agree or
disagree
Somewhat
agree
Strongly
agree
1. Although Jane is not a trained accountant, she
is nevertheless required to be able to read and
understand ﬁnancial material.
7.7 4.6 0 35.4 52.3*
2. Every director, whether executive or non-
executive, must take responsibility for the
accuracy and veracity of the company’s
ﬁnancial statements.
4.6 4.6 3.1 38.5 49.2*
3. Jane is not entitled to rely only on the
judgment and advice of the Chief Financial
Ofﬁcer or of the management team.
9.2 13.8 9.2 43.1 24.6*
4. Jane is not a trained accountant, and hence she
cannot be responsible for detecting the error.
30.8* 36.9 4.6 18.5 9.2
5. As a non-executive director, Jane is not subject
to the same standards of skill and competence
with respect to the reading and understanding
of ﬁnancial material that are expected of an
executive director.**
35.4 29.2 12.3 13.8 9.2
6. Jane is entitled to rely on the management
team and the Chief Financial Ofﬁcer to draw
the Board’s attention to any discrepancies in
the ﬁnancial statements.
20.0* 15.4 6.2 38.5 20.0
7. As a director, Jane will need to have some
knowledge of accounting practice and
standards.
6.2 7.7 10.8 30.8 44.6*
*Denotes the correct answer.
** Is an opinion statement.
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First, respondents are less certain as to the extent to which reliance on the judgment and
advice of the chief ﬁnancial ofﬁcer and themanagement is permitted (Table 6, Statements
3 and 6) with more respondents indicating ‘somewhat agree’ than ‘strongly agree’.
Second, respondents are less certain whether a director who is not a trained accountant
should be responsible for detecting the error in the accounts (Table 6, Statement 4) with
more respondents selecting ‘somewhat disagree’ than ‘strongly disagree’.
What these results might indicate is that the respondents were not entirely conﬁdent
as to what the correct response should be, and would thus prefer to take a somewhat
less absolute stance. Be that as it may, we would conclude from these results that the
respondents are generally aware that the ﬁnal responsibility vis-à-vis ﬁnancial
statements lies with the directors. It is interesting to see how similar these results are
to those obtained in two other studies on directors’ duties, one conducted in Hong
Kong,96 and the other inMalaysia.97 Both studies concluded that their respective target
respondents were well aware of their responsibilities vis-à-vis the preparation and
tabling of ﬁnancial statements and reports. It should, however, be pointed out that
both studies targeted directors of public listed companies. The Hong Kong study
involved only managing directors, whilst the Malaysian study surveyed only non-
executive directors. It may well be that these categories of directors, namely managing
directors and independent directors of public listed companies, are generally expected
to be more knowledgeable and aware of their obligations in any case, given the higher
degree of scrutiny and regulatory oversight that listed companies are subject to.98 In
our case, the high level of awareness as to the obligations of directors in connection
with ﬁnancial statements may in part be due to the information and advice provided by
ACRA. Indeed, ACRA has been encouraging directors to attend a training course on
ﬁnancial reporting run by SID by subsidizing about 50 per cent of the course fees.99
E. Corporate Governance and Trust
In addition to understanding the roles and duties of directors, this article also seeks to
explore the extent to which directors trust senior management within the company.
The seminal work of Mayer, Davis and Schoorman100 deﬁne trust as:
[T]he willingness of a party to be vulnerable to the actions of another party based on the
expectation that the other will perform a particular action important to the trust
irrespective of the ability to monitor or control that other party.101
96. Abdul Majid, Low Chee Keong and Krishnan Arjunan (n 16) 79.
97. Aiman Nariman Mohd Sulaiman and Wan Jamaliah Wan Jusoh (n 16).
98. The authors of the respective studies noted as much: see Abdul Majid, Low Chee Keong and Krishnan
Arjunan (n 16) 88; Aiman Nariman Mohd Sulaiman and Wan Jamaliah Wan Jusoh (n 16) 316–17.
99. ACRA, ‘Preparing Financial Statements: Directors’ Duties in relation to Financial Reporting’ (ACRA)
<www.acra.gov.sg/components/wireframes/howToGuidesChapters.aspx?pageid=1645#1807>
accessed 14 December 2018.
100. Roger CMayer, James H Davis and F David Schoorman, ‘An Integrative Model of Organizational Trust’
(1995) 20(3) Academy of Management Review 709.
101. ibid 712.
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In the trust literature, for trust in senior management to occur, directors would have
evaluated the trustworthiness of senior management in the areas of senior management’s
ability (or general competence), benevolence (towards the directors), and integrity.
Ability is deﬁned as ‘that group of skills, competencies, and characteristics that enable a
party to have some inﬂuence within some speciﬁc domain’.102 Benevolence is deﬁned as
‘the extent to which a trustee is believed to want to do good to the trustor, aside from an
egocentric proﬁt motive’,103while integrity is ‘the perception that the trustee adheres to a
set of principles that the trustor ﬁnds acceptable’.104 Extant research has found a strong
correlation between the three trustworthiness factors and trust largely in the context of
the supervisor-subordinate relationship.105
The inherent feature in the relationship between boards and the CEO is that boards
are supposed to be independent. It has been asserted that the more independent the
board, the more effective it will be in carrying out its duties.106 There is, however, some
evidence to suggest that depending on the bargaining power of the different parties,
CEOs who are successful, and hence perceived to be higher in ability, could possibly
bargain for less independent boards.107 The higher credibility of such CEOsmeans that
board members may also be more likely to trust the CEO, and hence the senior
management team. Such trust holds performance implications for the directors in terms
of exercising due diligence in decision making. We therefore sought to assess the trust
levels of directors towards senior management as a ﬁrst step to understanding
perceptions of board directors towards senior management.
We found the mean trust level to be 2.65 (standard deviation=0.87) on a 5-point
scale (ranging from 1-strongly disagree to 5-strongly agree), which means directors do
not trust their senior management team. We conclude that directors’ trust in their
senior management team is somewhat low. While directors have to work with the
senior management team in creating performance, a higher level of trust would
certainly facilitate behavioural dynamics towards higher collaboration and hence
performance. The next step of our work would be to assess if directors’ trust in the
senior management team affects board effectiveness.
iv. conclusion
As we noted at the start of this article, the regulation of companies across jurisdictions
is underpinned by a high degree of commonality. For jurisdictions with a common law
heritage and tradition, especially the countries of the Commonwealth, the observable
102. ibid 717.
103. ibid 718.
104. ibid 719.
105. Jason A Colquitt, Brent A Scott and Jeffrey A LePine, ‘Trust, Trustworthiness, and Trust Propensity: A
Meta-Analytic Test of Their Unique Relationships With Risk Taking and Job Performance’ (2007) 92(4)
Journal of Applied Psychology 909.
106. James D Westphal, ‘Collaboration in the Boardroom: Behavioural and Performance Consequences of
CEO-Board Social Ties’ (1999) 42(1) Academy of Management Journal 7.
107. See eg Audra L Boone and others, ‘The Determinants of Corporate Board Size and Composition: An
Empirical Analysis’ (2007) 85(1) Journal of Financial Economics 66.
62 a s i an journal of comparat i v e law
https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/asjcl.2019.2
Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. IP address: 116.15.182.27, on 29 Jul 2019 at 11:31:26, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use, available at
legal convergence is even more acute. This background provides a compelling basis for
comparing how similar regulatory regimes operate in different jurisdictions. Inquiries
of this nature go beyond the literal text of the laws in question, and enhances our
understanding of how these laws function within their particular social, political, and
cultural context.
This article is concerned with the legal constraints that are imposed on directors, an
area of corporate law that is a key pillar of the corporate governance regimes of many
jurisdictions. Speciﬁcally, we explored the level of understanding of directors’ duties
and responsibilities among directors. We found that a good proportion of our
respondents have a fairly high level of awareness of their duties. However, while the
majority of the respondents believe that their primary responsibility is to shareholders,
the results point to inconsistencies that raise the question of whether our sample of
directors believe that the law mandates due consideration of other stakeholder
interests, an area that needs further research. In addition, in the area of nominee
loyalty, we found the respondents to be generally aware that their primary
consideration should be the interests of the company. On the other hand, some
respondents believe that it is permissible for nominee directors of joint venture
companies to act in the interests of their appointors. With respect to duties in
connection with ﬁnancial statements, a convincing majority of the respondents are
aware of their legal obligations. However, the respondents seem less certain as to the
extent to which directors are permitted to rely on the judgment and advice of the
management team. Clearly, whilst it may be concluded from our study that
the directors surveyed are generally cognizant of their legal duties and obligations,
there remain areas where this awareness is lacking. Any outreach or director-education
programmes should therefore take into account these areas.
There are however limitations to a study of this nature. Whilst we attempted to
collect data from as randomized a sample as possible by accessing multiple sources and
using different methods, the most complete responses camemainly from those obtained
by our research assistants in face-to-face interviews. This might mean that our sample
is biased as those who were willing to participate in the survey are likely to be those
who are already concerned about their obligations. The respondents may therefore not
be as representative of the larger population of directors as we would have preferred,
raising concerns with external validity of our results. Clearly, further work can be done
to better understand the extent of the gap and the nuances involved. On a more
practical level, much work remains to be done in terms of informing and educating
directors on their duties and responsibilities.
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